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Abstract
Due to data dependency and model leakage prop-
erties, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) exhibit
several security vulnerabilities, e.g., training or
inference data poisoning, backdoors, Trojans,
model stealing, etc. Several security attacks, es-
pecially the black-box-based, exploited these vul-
nerabilities but most of them require output prob-
ability vector/distribution. These attacks can be
mitigated by concealing the output probability
vector/distribution. To address this limitation,
decision-based attacks have been proposed which
can estimate the model (gradient, classification
behavior and other parameters) but they require
several thousand queries to generate a single untar-
geted attack image. However, in real-time attacks,
resources and attack time are very crucial param-
eters. Therefore, in resource constrained systems,
e.g., autonomous vehicles where an untargeted
attack can have a catastrophic effect, these attacks
may not work efficiently. To address this limi-
tation, we propose a resource efficient decision-
based methodology which generates the imper-
ceptible attack, i.e., the RED-Attack, for a given
black-box model.
The proposed methodology follows two main
steps to generate the imperceptible attack, i.e.,
classification boundary estimation and adversarial
noise optimization. Firstly, we propose a half-
interval search-based algorithm for estimating a
sample on the classification boundary using a tar-
get image and a randomly selected image from
another class. Secondly, we propose an optimiza-
tion algorithm which first, introduces small per-
turbation in some randomly selected pixels of the
estimated sample. Then to ensure imperceptibility,
it optimizes the distance between the perturbed
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and target samples.
For illustration, we evaluate it for CFAR-10 and
German Traffic Sign Recognition (GTSR) using
state-of-the-art networks. The experimental re-
sults show that it generates adversarial exam-
ples with better imperceptibility (96.1%, 71.7%
and 203% for perturbation norm, Structural Simi-
larity Index and Correlation Coefficient, respec-
tively, for limited iteration (1000)) as compared
to Decision-based Attack.
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have revolutionized the
computing paradigms but due to their inherent security
vulnerabilities, i.e., training or inference data poisoning
(Khalid et al., 2018), backdoors (Biggio & Roli, 2018; Gu
et al., 2017), Trojans (Li et al., 2018; Zou et al., 2018; Chen
et al., 2018), etc., they can lead to catastrophic effects in
safety-critical applications, e.g., in autonomous driving (Stil-
goe, 2018). Several security attacks have been proposed that
exploit these security vulnerabilities, however, the adver-
sarial attacks have emerged as one of the most common
and successful class of security attacks against DNNs and
can be defined as the carefully-crafted imperceptible data
corruptions to fool DNNs for misclassification (Goodfel-
low et al., 2014). The implementation and effectiveness of
these attacks depend upon the underlying assumption for
attacker’s access to the DNNs, i.e., white-box and black-box
scenarios.
White-Box Attacks: Most of the state-of-the-art attacks
assume the white-box scenario in which the adversary has
full knowledge of the DNN architecture and the correspond-
ing parameters (weights and biases), e.g., Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2014), iterative
FGSM (I-FGSM) (Kurakin et al., 2016), Jacobian Saliency
Map Attack (JSMA) (Papernot et al., 2015), Carlini-Wagner
(CW) Attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017), One-Pixel Attack,
Universal Adversarial Perturbation, DeepFool, PGD-Attack,
etc. Although these attacks can generate imperceptible ad-
versarial examples efficiently, the underlying assumption of
access to the complete DNN model is impractical in most of
ar
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Figure 1. Threat Models: Different black-box attack and defense scenarios while assuming the black-box model and access to output
classification probability vectors/distribution or labels
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Figure 2. Adversarial Examples generated using Decision-based Un-targeted Attacks on German Traffic Sign Recognition benchmarks for
the 10000 iterations. (Perturbation: strength of Adversarial noise, SSI: Structural Similarity Index; CR: Correlation Index )
the scenarios.
Black-Box Attacks: Unlike white-box attacks, black-box
attacks are not based on the aforementioned assumption and,
therefore, limits the capability of the adversary because of
the limited knowledge about the target system. Based on
the available information in black-box scenarios, following
can be the three possible threat models:
1. Threat Model I: Adversary has access to the output
probability vector/distribution while does not have ac-
cess to the model parameters, as shown in Fig. 1(a).
2. Threat Model II: Adversary has access only to the
probability of the most probable class detected by the
DNN classifier (in case of a classification problem), as
shown in Fig. 1(b).
3. Threat Model III: Adversary has access only to the
final output of the system, i.e., the final class label in
case of the a classification, as shown in Fig. 1(c).
Most of the state-of-the-art black-box attacks assume threat
models I or II, e.g., Zeroth-Order Optimization-based Attack
(Chen et al., 2017) and Gen-Attack (Alzantot et al., 2018).
However, these attacks can be mitigated by concealing the
information about the classification probability, i.e., by con-
sidering Threat Model III (see Fig. 1(c)). To address this
limitation, decision-based attack (Brendel et al., 2017) has
been proposed which utilizes the random search algorithm
to estimate the classification boundary. Though decision-
Clean 
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Adversarial 
Images
Pert. Norm 1.51 2.44 1.54 3.47 0.29
Maximum # of Queries = 1 k Maximum # of Queries = 10 k
94.9 275.8 293.1 269.2 13.0
Figure 3. Adversarial Examples generated by the Decision-based
attack with maximum iteration = 1000. This analysis shows
that by reducing the number of iteration (limited resources), e.g.,
the perceptibility of the images increases, 1.51 to 94.9. Where
Pert.Norm =
∑
(AdversarialImage− CleanImage)2
based attack can nullify the probability concealing-based
defense, it possess the following limitations:
1. It requires multiple reference samples to generate a
single adversarial example and thereby requires high
memory/bandwidth resources.
2. The technique requires a large number of infer-
ences/queries to generate a single adversarial example,
for example, on average around 10000 for the examples
illustrated in Fig. 2.
3. In case of restricted number of allowed iterations
(where each iteration can have multiple queries), the
performance of the decision-based attack can reduces
significantly, as illustrated in Fig. 3)
Associated Research Challenge: Based on the above-
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Figure 4. The proposed RED-Attack during typical design cycle
for ML-based systems under the Threat Model III
mentioned limitations, we can safely conclude that decision-
based attack cannot be applied to a resource and energy
constraint systems, e.g., autonomous vehicles. Thus it raises
a key research questions: How to reduce the number of
queries for generating an adversarial example while main-
taining the imperceptibility (maximizing the correlation co-
efficient and structural similarity index)?
1.1. Novel Contributions
To address the above-mentioned research challenge, in
this paper, we propose Resource-Efficient Decision-based
methodology to generate an imperceptible adversarial attack
under the threat model III. The underlying assumption for
the proposed methodology is that it takes the pre-processed
image and its corresponding class label from the black-box
model. Then it iteratively generates the adversarial image
multiple time, computes the corresponding classification
label for each iteration and optimizes it by finding the closet
adversarial image (on classification boundary) from input
image, as shown in Fig. 4. In a nutshell, this paper make
the following contributions:
1. To reduce the number of queries, we propose a single
reference sample-based half-interval search algorithm
to estimate the classification boundary.
2. To maximize the imperceptibility, we propose an opti-
mization algorithm which combines the half-interval
search algorithm with gradient estimation to identify
the closest adversarial example (on boundary) from the
input image.
To illustrate the effectiveness of the RED-Attack, we evalu-
ate it for the CIFAR-10 and the GTSR dataset using state-of-
the-art networks. The comparative analysis of results shows
that the proposed approach successfully generates adversar-
ial examples with much less perceptibility as compared to
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Figure 5. RED-Attack: Resource-Efficient Decision based method-
ology to generate on imperceptible attack while assuming the
Threat Model III.
Algorithm 1 Boundary Estimation
Inputs:
IA2 = Source image;
IB2 = Sample Image from the target class;
δmin = Maximum Allowed Perturbation;
Output:
Ii = Adversarial Image;
Select a random sample Adversarial Image (Ii)
Compute k = fclassifier(Ii);
Compute δ = max(IA2 − Ii);
repeat
if fclassifier(IA) 6= k then
Compute IB2 = Ii
else
Compute IA2 = Ii
end if
Compute Ii = IA2+IB22
Compute k = fclassifier(Ii);
Compute δ = max(IA2 − Ii);
until δ > δmin
Decision-based Attack. We empirically show that, on aver-
age, the perturbation norm of adversarial images from their
corresponding source images is decreased by 96.1 %, while
their SSI and CC with respect to the corresponding clean
images is increased by 71.7 % and 203 %, respectively.
2. Proposed Methodology
The proposed resource-efficient decision based attack
methodology consists of two major steps: classification
boundary estimation and optimization of attack image with
respect to maximum allowed perturbations δmin.
2.1. Boundary Estimation
The first step is to estimate the boundary for which we
propose a half-interval search based algorithm that requires
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Figure 6. Proposed methodology to generate the optimized imperceptible hyper-sphere attacks
a target image and a reference image from any other class,
as shown in Algorithm 1 (See Step 1 of the Fig. 6).
Definition 1 Let IA2, IB2 and δmin be the source image
(class: A), reference image (class: other than A) and maxi-
mum allowed estimation error. The goal of this algorithm
is to find a sample which has tolerable distance (less than
δmin) from the classification boundary and has label differ-
ent from that of the source image, mathematically it can be
defined as:
∃ Ii : f(Ii) 6= f(IA2) ∧ max(Ii − IA2) ≤ δmin
To generate the appropriate Ii, the proposed algorithm per-
form the half-interval search using the source image (IA2)
and the reference image (IB2). It first finds the half way
point Ii between IA2 and IB2 by computing the average
of the two and then replaces IA2 or IB2 with Ii depending
upon the class in which Ii falls. For examples, if the label of
the half way point Ii is class A then algorithm replaces IA2
with Ii and if its label is not A then the algorithm replaces
IB2 with Ii. The algorithm repeats this process until the
maximum distance of Ii from the IA2 is less than δmin and
while ensuring the f(Ii) 6= f(IA2). The proposed bound-
ary estimation can be used for targeted attack if we choose
the reference image from the target class.
2.2. Optimization of Attack Image
The second step of the proposed methodology is to optimize
noise on the sample Ii (output of the boundary estimation).
We propose to incorporate the adaptive update in the zeroth-
order stochastic algorithm to efficiently optimize it.
Definition 2 Let IA2, IB2, δmin and Ii be the source image
(class: A), reference image (class: other than A), maximum
allowed estimation error and perturbed image, respectively.
The goal of this algorithm is to minimize distance of Ii from
IA2 while ensuring that it has label different than the source
image, mathematically it can be defined as:
∀ Ii min(Ii − IA2) : f(Ii) 6= f(IA2)
To achieve this goal, we first identify the sign of the gra-
Algorithm 2 Gradient Estimation
Inputs:
IA = Source image;
IB = Sample Image from the target class;
Ii = Adversarial Image;
n = Number of pixels to perturb;
θ = Relative Perturbation in each pixel;
Output:
Ii2 = Noisy Adversarial Image;
g = Sign of the Gradient;
Select a random sample Adversarial Image (Ii);
Compute I0 = zeros;
Set randomly selected n pixels of I0 to the maximum
value a pixel can have;
Compute Ii2 = Ii + θ × I0; and Compute Ii2
Compute d2 =
∑
(Ii2 − IA)2; and d1 =
∑
(Ii − IA)2;
if d2 > d1 then
Compute g = −1;
else if d2 < d1 then
Compute g = 1;
else
Compute g = 0;
end if
dient for estimating the boundary behavior (minima). For
example, if the sign is positive then we continue moving
in the same direction; otherwise we switch the direction,
as shown in Algorithm 2. Once the direction is identified,
the next key challenge is to select the appropriate hop size.
Therefore, to address this challenge, we propose an algo-
rithm (Algorithm 3) which introduces adaptive hop size by
applying the half-interval update. For example, for updat-
ing, it starts with maximum hop size and then it reduces it
by half. The algorithm repeats itself until it finds the local
minima, illustrated by Step 3-5 of Fig. 11.
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Parameters Value Parameters Value
Epochs 15 Batch Size 128
j 8 δmin 0.01
n 20 θ 0.0196
Optimizer Adam Learning rate 0.0001
decay 1e-6 Test Images 10000
CUDA
Tool-kit
CuDNN
Tensorflow
CPU
Core i3-8100
Black-Box 
CNN
GPU
GeForce 
GTX1060 
RED-
Attack
Training DatasetAdversarial 
Examples
CNN for CIFAR-10:Conv2D(64, 3x3) - Conv2D(64, 3x3) - Conv2D(128, 
3x3) - Conv2D(128, 3x3) - Dense(256) - Dense(256) - Dense(10) - Softmax()
CNN for GTSRB: Lambda(lambda p: p/255.0 - 0.5) - Conv2D(3, 1x1) -
Conv2D(16, 5x5, (2, 2)) - Conv2D(32, 3x3) - MaxPool2D( (2, 2), (2, 2)) -
Conv2D(64, 3x3) - Conv2D(128, 3x3) - Flatten() - Dropout(0.5) - Dense(128) 
- Dropout(0.5) - Dense(43) – softmax()
Datasets: CIFAR-10 (70% Test Accuracy), GTSRB (95.2% Test Accuracy)
Threat Models: Threat Model III. Blind Output Black-Box Threat Model
Maximum Number of Queries: 1000 (unless otherwise stated)
Figure 7. Experimental setup and tool flow for evaluating the proposed RED-Attack
Algorithm 3 Efficient Update
Inputs:
IA2 = Copy of the Source image;
IB = Sample Image from the target class;
Ii = Adversarial Image;
Ii2 = Randomly Perturbed Adversarial Image;
g = Gradient Sign;
j = Maximum Jump;
Output:
Ii,new = A new instance of adversarial example;
Compute ∆ = g × (Ii2 − Ii); and λ = j;
Compute Ii,new = Ii + λ×∆;
repeat
Compute λ = λ2 ; and Ii,new = Ii + λ×∆;
until
∑
(Ii,new − IA)2 >
∑
(Ii − IA)2
if
∑
(Ii,new − IA)2 >
∑
(Ii − IA)2 then
Compute Ii,new = Ii;
end if
3. Experimental Results and Discussions
3.1. Experimental Setup
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed RED-
Attack, we evaluated several un-targetd attacks on CIFAR10
and GTSR for state-of-the-art networks (Fig. 7).
3.2. Experimental Analysis
The imperceptibility of the adversarial image improves it-
eratively by minimizing its distance from the source image,
as shown in Fig. 8. Form the analysis of this figure, we
identify the following key observation: The adversarial im-
age generated in first few iterations are not imperceptible
but not even recognizable but over time with help of query
and optimization algorithm it achieves the imperceptibility.
Thus, in black-box attack, if we limit the number of queries
then its imperceptibility decreases drastically.
3.3. Effects of Hyper-parameters on perceptibility (d)
We measure the distance of adversarial image from its
source source image using the L2-Norm of perturbation
which is defined as the pixel-wise sum of (SourceImage−
AdversarialImage)2. We monitor the effect of changing
Target 20 100 200 4000 Original
Figure 8. Visualizing the adversarial examples at various query
counts.
three different hyper-parameters, introduced in our attacks,
on the distance of the adversarial examples from their corre-
sponding source examples.
3.3.1. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
1. δmin - measures the maximum tolerable error, in terms
of each pixel value, while computing the boundary point
in Algorithm 1. Unless, otherwise stated, the typical
value we use for δmin is 1.
2. n - defines the number of pixels, randomly selected to
be perturbed in each iteration in order to estimate the
gradient of the distance of the adversarial example from
the source example (Algorithm 2). Unless otherwise
stated, the typical value we use for n is 5.
3. θ - defines the magnitude of noise added in each of the n
randomly selected pixels relative to the maximum value,
a pixel can have. Unless otherwise stated, the typical
value we use for θ is 5.
3.3.2. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
Figures 9 and 10 shows the source examples that we use for
targeted and un-targeted attacks along with the initial target
examples and the generated adversarial examples.
1. As δmin increases, the quality of the adversarial example
at a given query count decreases, due to the increase in
its distance from the source example. This is because
the larger value of δmin results in an imprecise boundary
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Figure 9. Adversarial examples generated by performing both targeted and un-targeted attacks for various values of δmin, nandθ. The
corresponding source/victim examples and the examples of the target class are given for each case. All the adversarial examples generated
were successfully classified to be of the target class for targeted attacks and were mis-classified for the un-targeted attacks.
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Figure 10. The trends of Perturbation norm (d) from the corresponding source examples over time for various values of δmin, nandθ = 5.
(From left to right) Mis-classification attack on Airplane, Car, Bird and Cat. The initial target image was chosen to an image of a truck.
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Figure 11. Illustrating the effects of changing δmin on the gradi-
ents. a) Incorrect estimation for large δmin. b) Close approxima-
tion for small δmin
point, which in turn may result in an incorrect value of
the estimated gradient, as shown in Figure 11. How-
ever, smaller value of δmin results in a gradient direction,
closer to the required direction (see Figure 11b).
2. A larger value of n, initially results in a faster conver-
gence. The reason is that we only need to estimate an
overall trend of the boundary at initial stages. Estimating
the update direction for the adversarial example by per-
turbing a large number of values at once helps achieve
better results. However, Large n is highly vulnerable to
divergence as the attack progresses. This observation
suggests that the attack can be significantly improved
by changing the number of pixels perturbed, as the algo-
rithm progresses in an adaptive manner.
3. Similar trend is observed with the changes in θ because
estimating the gradients by introducing large perturba-
tions in the image give an overall trend of the boundary
instead of more precise localized gradients, as given by
small perturbations. This in turn helps the algorithm to
initially converge faster. However, small values of θ give
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Figure 12. The trends of distance (d) of the adversarial example from the corresponding source examples as the algorithm progresses for
various values of δmin, nandθ on German Traffic Sign Dataset. The source image, target image and the generated adversarial image are
shown above each plot.
a more stable convergence towards the solution.
3.4. German Traffic Sign Data set
In order to find out the generality of the trends shown in
Figure 10, we perform a similar analysis on GTSR. In this
experiment, we randomly select any image from the test
data and generate adversarial example for fixed number of
queries. We compute perturbation norm (d) from their corre-
sponding source images and compare different approaches
based on these findings.
The results are shown in Figure 12. The complete set of
adversarial examples along with the corresponding source
images is shown in Figure 13.
3.4.1. KEY OBSERVATIONS AND INSIGHTS
1. Generally, the effect of changing hyper-parameters on the
perturbation norm of the adversarial example is almost
similar for GTSRB dataset and CIFAR-10.
2. We observe that the adversarial examples for untargeted
attack against GTSRB classifier converge much faster
as compared to the CIFAR-10 dataset. We attribute this
to much larger number of classes in GTSRB dataset as
compared to CIFAR-10 dataset.
3. As was observed in case of CIFAR-10, the attack can
significantly be improved by adaptively changing the
hyper-parameters as the attack progresses.
4. Comparison with the state-of-the-art
We compare our results with the state-of-the art Decision-
based Attack. We use the implementation provided in an
open source benchmark library, FoolBox (Rauber et al.,
2017). We limit the maximum number of queries to 1000
and evaluate our attack for different values of δmin, n and
θ. To compare our results with the Decision-based Attack,
we use three different metrics i.e. correlation coefficient
(CC), the squared L2-Norm (Pert. Norm) and the Structural
Similarity Index (SSI) of the adversarial image with respect
to the source image. Our results are shown in Figure 14.
It can be seen from the figure that the adversarial examples
produced by RED-Attack in this settings are significantly
superior to those produced by the Decision Attack. The
reason is binary stepping while searching for the boundary
point and efficient update process while computing a new
instance of adversarial example.
Here, we want to emphasize that in the long run, the
decision-based attack eventually surpasses the RED-Attack
e.g. if the query efficiency is not much of a concern or the
number of maximum queries is limited to 105 instead of
103, the adversarial examples found by the decision-based
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Figure 13. Adversarial examples generated by performing un-targeted attacks on the model trained for German Traffic Sign Classification
for various values of θ, n and δmin. The corresponding source/victim examples along with the images of another class (target examples)
specifying initial direction are given for each case. All the adversarial examples generated were successfully miss-classified by the
classifier. Unless otherwise stated, δmin = 0.01, n=20, θ = 0.0196. The maximum number of queries used to generate the images is 105
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Correlation Coefficient (CC) and Structural Similarity Index (SSI) of RED-Attack is significantly larger than Decision 
Attack. The Norm of Adversarial Example for RED-Attack is smaller than that for Decision Attack.
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Figure 14. Comparison of RED-Attack for different images (see) with Decision-based Attack for various values of δmin, n and θ. The
maximum number of allowed queries qmax = 1000. The metric used are Correlation coefficient (CC), Perturbation Norm (Norm) and
Structural Similarity Index (SSI) computed against Adversarial images and the corresponding source images.
attacks are better than those found by the RED-Attack.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel Resource-Efficient
Decision-based Imperceptible Attack (RED-Attack). It
utilizes a half-interval search-based algorithm to estimate
the classification boundary and an efficient update mecha-
nism to boost the convergence of an adversarial example for
decision-based attacks, in query limited settings. To illus-
trate the effectiveness of the RED-Attack, we evaluated it for
the CIFAR-10 and the GTSRB dataset using multiple state-
of-the-art networks. We limited the maximum number of
queries to 1000 and showed that the state-of-the-art decision-
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Figure 15. Comparison of the adversarial images generated by an untargeted Decision-based attack and those generated by an untargeted
RED-Attack for various values of δmin, n and θ. Please note that δmin = 0.01, n = 20 and θ = 0.0196, unless otherwise stated. The
maximum number of queries is 1000 for each adversarial image.
based attack is unable to find an imperceptible adversarial
example, while the RED-Attack arrives at a sufficiently
imperceptible adversarial example within the predefined
number of queries. Further, we empirically showed that,
on average, the perturbation norm of adversarial images
(from their corresponding source images) decreased by 96.1
%, while their Structural Similarity Index and Correlation
(with respect to the corresponding clean images) increased
by 71.7 % and 203 %, respectively.
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